Search results for "Truth value"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
Selection of Subjunctors in Turkic Non-Finite Complement Clauses
2013
The topic of the paper is Turkic clausal complementation: the syntactic and semantic behavior of complement clauses, the subjunctors that mark them, and the roles of various predicate types in selecting them. Two main types of bound complementizers serve as subjunctors in complement clauses: a participial and an infinitival type, both usually corresponding to the English complimentizer that. Traditionally, the semantic behavior of the complement clauses has been thought to depend on a distinction between factive and non-factive verbs. Complement clauses provided with participial subjunctors have been described as factive in contrast to non-factive complement clauses provided with infinitiva…
This, and This, and That
2021
More dependent clauses are discussed, and more surprising results emerge. The most important of these are that distinct clauses belonging to the same period can sometimes have an overlap, and that there are clauses that, though being neither interrogative nor imperative, are such that wondering about their truth value does not make sense.
Logics and operators
2003
Two connectives are of special interest in metalogical investigations — the connective of implication which is important due to its connections to the notion of inference, and the connective of equivalence. The latter connective expresses, in the material sense, the fact that two sentences have the same logical value while in the strict sense it expresses the fact that two sentences are interderivable on the basis of a given logic. The process of identification of equivalent sentences relative to theories of a logic C defines a class of abstract algebras. The members of the class are called Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of the logic C. One may abstract from the origin of these algebras and exa…
An Interlude: Matters of Method
2021
The discussion of everyday discourse developed so far makes two entirely new problems inescapable. The first is that in everyday discourse there is no algebra, either Boolean or non-Boolean, of truth values. The second is that a new polarity (conceptually) correct–incorrect, distinct both from true–false, and from grammatical–ungrammatical, becomes indispensable.
Truth, Negation and Meaning
2013
‘True’ and ‘False’ are defined through a linguistic rule requiring the negation operator. This is the elaboration of an idea proffered for the first time by the Stoics on the basis of some remarks by Aristotle and then in modern times by Frege and Wittgenstein. Another thesis of this essay is the following: the true/false rule is a sort of UR-Regel underlying all linguistic practices (including prayers and commands) and all human cultures. Reinterpreting the notion of Spielraum put forward by Wittgenstein in 4.463 of the Tractatus, I will present an implicational pragmatic theory of a true proposition. Jokes and reductio ad absurdum are explained as examples of Spielraum.